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541 
SHOULD WE HAVE A LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTION? 
Louis Michael Seidman* 
Here is a modest proposal: If I had the power to rewrite the 
United States Constitution, I would first take some time to think 
hard about the sort of country I wanted to live in. Having done 
my homework, I would then draft language that, to the best of 
my ability, insured that we had such a country. Some of the 
language would be substantive—for example, guaranteeing the 
rights that I think people ought to have and directly 
commanding outcomes that I think we ought to reach. Of course, 
there would also be procedural provisions. Various powers 
would be allocated and divided, various offices created and the 
duties of their occupants specified, and various practical details 
sorted out. But all of these procedural provisions would have but 
a single purpose—to produce the substantive outcomes that I 
preferred. 
On one level, this approach seems both obvious and 
question-begging. It is obvious because, after all, what else 
would one possibly expect? Of course my choice of a 
constitution will be dictated by my hopes for the country to be 
governed by the constitution. It is question-begging because it 
leaves unresolved the really hard issues about what sort of 
country I should want to live in and about what sort of 
constitutional design would create such a country. 
On another level, though, my proposal is deeply 
controversial. The constitution I drafted would not provide a 
level playing field on which people with different conceptions of 
justice could do battle. It would not be neutral as between 
competing conceptions of the good. It would not provide terms 
of fair cooperation for people with different such conceptions. It 
would not leave to individuals operating within a private sphere 
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the workings out of the distribution of resources or the pursuit of 
their own conception of happiness. Because my constitution 
would resolve, or attempt to resolve, all these matters in a 
particular and controversial way, it would not be democratic. In 
short, my constitution would lack all the hallmarks of 
constitutional liberalism. 
In this brief essay, I attempt to accomplish two things. In 
Part I, I defend my proposed constitution against its putative 
liberal critics. In Part II, I argue that given contingent but highly 
plausible empirical assumptions, the differences between my 
constitution and a liberal constitution are less dramatic than one 
might suppose. There are often sound, nonliberal grounds for 
supporting institutional arrangements that appear liberal. It 
turns out, then, that liberalism is both less attractive (Part I) and 
less necessary (Part II) than its defenders suppose. 
I. IN DEFENSE OF MY CONSTITUTION 
(OR HOW FANTASIZING ABOUT ABSOLUTE POWER 
CAN BE REALLY FUN, BUT ALSO QUITE DISTURBING) 
Before mounting a defense of my nonliberal constitution, 
we need to dispose of a move that would short-circuit the 
argument. Perhaps the kind of country I want (or should want) 
should be organized around liberal virtues. Perhaps, in other 
words, I should value for its own sake a system marked by what I 
take to be the main features of constitutional liberalism: a 
commitment to procedural fairness, a large private sphere, 
expansive negative rights, and neutrality with regard to matters 
of religion and other conceptions of the good.1 If these are my 
substantive preferences, then, obviously, I will end up supporting 
a liberal constitution that encourages these outcomes. To make 
the argument interesting, then, we need to assume that, as a 
substantive matter, I prefer something else. For example, I might 
think that a fair distribution of resources is central to justice and 
that a liberal society will not produce this distribution. Or I 
might worry that we face an environmental catastrophe and that 
liberal politics cannot be counted on to fend off disaster. Or I 
might believe that a particular set of religious beliefs is simply 
true and that a just society must be organized around those 
 
 1. There is, of course, a problem as to how one defines liberalism. The label is 
deeply ambiguous. For purposes of this essay, I am defining it as a theory that privileges 
the virtues I have mentioned in text. One might claim with some plausibility that these 
virtues are so vague and open-ended that they have no actual bite.  
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beliefs. Perhaps these positions are misguided—perhaps I ought 
to be a liberal. The question I want to address, though, is 
whether someone like me who is not persuaded by liberalism as 
a substantive matter should nonetheless favor a liberal 
constitution. 
At first, it may seem that setting up the argument in this 
way makes things way too easy. If we start by stipulating the 
truth of nonliberalism as a substantive matter, then it would 
seem to follow apodictically that our constitution should be 
nonliberal. In fact, though, the stipulation clarifies an important 
point that, in turn, helps support a position the truth of which is 
not merely built into a controversial premise. 
The point is that substantive liberalism, itself, entails a 
contestable substantive program that requires a substantive 
defense. For this reason, liberal constitutionalism is bedeviled by 
a well-known contradiction. Its chief attraction is its claim to 
neutrality as between various reasonable political and moral 
positions. Liberals seize on this neutrality to insist that their 
doctrine can be embraced by adherents to all these positions. 
But liberalism cannot be neutral about itself. By definition, a 
liberal constitution biases outcomes toward liberalism and is, 
therefore, not “fair” to nonliberalism. 
The controversial position that follows from this point is 
that people who favor nonliberal constitutions should not be 
subject to special criticism on the ground that they are rejecting 
“fairness” in the sense of an ex ante right of all persons to equal 
treatment and regard. All constitutions—including supposedly 
liberal ones—take contestable positions on points of 
disagreement. They are all “unfair” to people who have different 
positions and all of them treat these people unequally. There is 
therefore no ground for privileging liberal constitutions before 
the argument about substantive liberalism even begins. 
I have made this point abstractly, but it may help to make it 
concretely with regard to our own Constitution. Defenders of 
the U.S. Constitution often argue that it is liberal in the sense 
that its binding force derives from the fact that it is an agreement 
that people with a wide variety of substantive conceptions of 
justice can accept. As Justice Holmes famously said, it is “made 
for people of fundamentally differing views.”2 Several 
generations after Holmes wrote, John Hart Ely argued that our 
 
 2. Lochner v. N.Y., 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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Constitution was liberal in the sense that it was overwhelmingly 
about fair procedures. He claimed that for the most part the 
Constitution did not resolve controversial questions of 
substantive value but, instead, left them for a democratic process 
that was fair to all participants in the polity. 3 In our own time, 
libertarians like Randy Barnett, while less enthusiastic about 
democracy than Holmes and Ely, nonetheless argue that we 
have a liberal constitution in the sense that it protects a large 
sphere for individual liberty. For this reason, they claim, our 
Constitution should be attractive to people with different 
substantive conceptions of the good.4 All of these thinkers, 
writing within different versions of the liberal constitutional 
tradition, claim that the U.S. Constitution is worthy of respect 
because it is transsubstantive. 
These claims are demonstrably false. They are also deeply 
ironic given our Constitution’s origins.  The United States 
Constitution was not written so as to provide common ground 
for people who disagreed about issues that mattered. Although 
its apologists persist in ignoring or denying the fact, it is simply 
the case that an important driving force behind the new 
constitution came from speculators in Revolutionary War debt 
who had bought up the debt at pennies on the dollar and then 
wanted the government to impose taxes high enough to insure 
that the debt was redeemed at face value.5 The Constitution was 
meant to reduce the power of the state governments that 
threatened these interests and, more broadly, to protect the 
emerging commercial class at the expense of farmers and 
debtors.6 Southern delegates were happy to go along with this 
agenda, but they also demanded an additional price: numerous 
provisions that protected and entrenched slavery.7 
All this is ancient history, but even as amended and 
interpreted, our modern Constitution is hardly a blank sub-
stantive slate. We can begin with the substantive conceptions of 
justice that it pretty clearly rules out.  Pace Pat Robertson, it 
 
 3. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). 
 4. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004). 
 5. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 34–35 (1913). For the best recent account with elaborate 
documentation, see WOODY HOLTON, UNRULY AMERICANS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2007). 
 6. BEARD, supra note 5, at 52–63. 
 7. Id. at 29–30, 169–70, 176–77, 192. 
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does not permit a Christian theocracy. Pace Mark Tushnet, its 
protections for private property strongly discourage socialism. 
Pace Holmes and Ely, institutions like the Senate, the Electoral 
College and the Supreme Court mean that it does not even 
permit anything like serious democracy. 
Then there are the things that our Constitution requires or 
strongly encourages. It mandates active government intervention 
to protect existing distributions of property and private market 
ordering. For the most part, it obliges the victims of injury 
imposed by speech to bear their own losses. It encourages 
political gridlock. It puts all of us at the mercy of a single person 
who is vested with the capacity to blow up the world. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that these supposed defects 
in our Constitution mean that it should be condemned. It is non-
neutral with regard to the matters described above, but it is not 
as if some other constitution could be neutral. My point is only 
that all constitutions, including our own, promote some political 
outcomes and obstruct others. These outcomes require a defense 
on the merits, and the defense cannot simply be that this is what 
liberalism requires. 
There is, to be sure, a response to these complaints. Perhaps 
the Constitution is sufficiently open-textured that it does not 
really command any of these results. True, some readings of the 
text seem more plausible than others, and some readings seem 
completely implausible. But the substantive yoke the Con-
stitution apparently imposes on us is actually an artifact of 
existing power distributions, or at least so the argument goes. 
Change the distributions and other interpretations of the 
document will suddenly become plausible. 
For example, our system of separated and divided powers 
strongly encourages gridlock, but presidents like Franklin 
Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson managed to overcome these 
hurdles. The free speech clause is open to readings, and 
occasionally has been read, to force speakers to pay for some of 
the injuries their speech causes.8 The claim that the Obama 
administration has produced socialism is nonsense, but it is true 
that the recent economic crisis has produced a greater degree of 
public ownership and control over some segments of the 
economy. Constitutional structure encourages presidential power, 
 
 8. E.g., Ozer v. Borquez, 940 P.2d 371 (Col. 1997) (recognizing a tort claim for the 
public disclosure of private facts and affirming an award of compensatory damages).  
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but it took the intersection of that structure with twentieth-
century developments to produce it. 
Given our existing Constitution, and given my own 
substantive commitments, I think that it is important for people 
to understand how open-textured the Constitution is. The best 
hope for our existing Constitution is that people will come to see 
its invocation of grand ideas like liberty, equality, and a “more 
perfect union” as open for exploitation by any side of any 
dispute. One might advance this understanding on liberal 
grounds: Only a constitution that is completely unsettled 
provides grounds for fair cooperation among people with 
different views. But, as I will argue in the next Part, the 
understanding can also serve nonliberal ends. Anyone opposed 
to the outcomes that our current Constitution produces will have 
an incentive to persuade people that the Constitution, properly 
understood, need not dictate these outcomes. 
The question before us, though, is not what understanding 
we should have of our existing Constitution, but how to draft a 
new one. If we really believed that constitutional language was 
wholly irrelevant—that its meaning was wholly dictated by 
power relationships—then there would be no point to the 
exercise. The project makes sense only if, as I believe to be true, 
there is a dialectical relationship between text and power. 
Interpretation of text is often or always an artifact of power 
distributions, but the text also helps constitute those 
distributions in the first place. Any new text that we draft will be 
vulnerable to new interpretations as social and material facts 
change. Still, that text will have some role in establishing and 
preserving those social and material facts. 
If all this is right, then it follows that a drafter needs to think 
first and foremost about how he wants that power distributed.  
Neutrality is not an option. All political arrangements, including 
those entrenched by our present Constitution, privilege some at 
the expense of others. Choices about who benefits and who is 
hurt are both inevitable and inevitably controversial. 
One would suppose that all of this was obvious were it not 
for the frequency with which it is denied. Why are so many so 
resistant to these conclusions? Some of the problem is caused by 
misunderstanding. At first, it might seem that the position I 
advance here is selfish and arrogant. Why privilege my whims 
and preferences over everyone else’s? How can I be so certain 
that I am right? 
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There is something to this complaint if one means by it that 
a constitution drafter should worry deeply about her 
responsibility. After all, she has the fate of an entire society in 
her hands. But this worry and responsibility is built into the 
hypothetical situation we are asked to address. If I alone were 
given the power to rewrite the Constitution, then, of course, I 
would ultimately have to resolve contested issues in the way that 
I think best. It would be very odd—maybe even conceptually 
impossible—for me to resolve these questions any other way. 
It does not follow that I would resolve them selfishly or 
without consulting others. To be sure, one substantive theory of 
constitutional governance is that our polity should maximize my 
personal happiness and preference satisfaction. If this were my 
theory, then I would draft a constitution that attempted to 
implement it. But then I would be subject to legitimate criticism 
for advancing a very poor constitutional theory. In fact, as it 
happens, this is not a theory that I hold, and I doubt that many 
others do either. There is simply no logical connection between 
the premise that my constitution must inevitably advance my 
own theory and the conclusion that it would advance a selfish 
theory. 
Nor does it follow that I would insist on my own 
omniscience and infallibility. In fact, I am well aware of my own 
limitations (or at least, perhaps arrogantly, I think that I am), 
and I would do my best to take account of these limitations as I 
went about my task. I would listen to what others have to say, 
and I would surely recognize that changing material and cultural 
conditions might make rigid constitutional language counter-
productive in the future. I would need to think hard about the 
merits of the advice I received, about how specific my 
constitutional language should be, and about what institutions 
should be assigned the tasks of interpretation and application 
going forward. 
The fact remains that after I had done all this, it is, once 
again, simply built into the hypothetical situation that I would be 
responsible for the draft constitution that I produced. 
Ultimately, I am the one who must decide whose advice to 
accept, what language to include, what to specify now and what 
to leave to future generations. Humility should not be confused 
with cowardice, and doubt and modesty are no excuse for 
leaving the task unfinished. After all, if I did not draft the 
document, someone else would, and then the document would 
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incorporate her ideas rather than mine. And if I thought that her 
ideas were better than mine, then her ideas would be mine. 
There is another set of objections the answers to which may 
not be directly built into the hypothetical problem. If my 
constitution reflects no more than my own conception of the 
kind of country I want to live in, then what makes it legitimate? 
Why should someone with a different conception feel any 
obligation to obey it? The problem of constitutional obligation is 
vexing and complex, and I will not set out a full theory here. 
Instead, what follows is a sketch addressed to the particular 
question before us—whether we should have a liberal 
constitution. 
One solution to the legitimacy problem might once again be 
built into the hypothetical situation.  Perhaps we are to imagine 
that I have somehow been given not only the task of drafting a 
new constitution, but also the authority to promulgate it. If I 
have been authorized to promulgate the constitution, then this 
authority, whatever its source, also makes my constitution 
legitimate and obligates others to obey it. 
Even if I have not been endowed with authority in this 
sense, perhaps we are to imagine that I have been granted 
sufficient power to coerce compliance. Why worry about 
legitimacy if one has power?  Indeed, if we build omnipotence 
into the hypothetical, why worry about a constitution at all? 
With sufficient power, I could simply command the outcomes I 
desired without bothering to justify them by reference to a 
document written out beforehand. 
But this solution is too simple. Apart from whatever moral 
qualms one has about naked coercion, there are conceptual 
difficulties with the assumption that effective coercive power can 
ever exist absent some sort of persuasion. No one person has the 
physical power to compel an entire society. Even in a brutal, 
totalitarian country, the regime’s enforcers, thugs though they 
be, must be persuaded to obey the dictator. To be sure, they 
might be persuaded by bribes, but then the dictator must 
persuade the person who collects and stores the money to 
dispense it as the dictator directs. Ultimately, it turns out, there 
must be some kind of politics in every society, however 
authoritarian. 
The question, then, is what will drive this politics? There are 
three possibilities. First, there is the politics of self-interest. 
People might be motivated to obey by, say, fear of death or 
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imprisonment, monetary or other material rewards and 
deprivations, and the like. In other words, the regime might use 
negative and positive incentives to buy off or scare off its 
opponents. 
There is no reason to disparage this politics. As argued 
above, no political system can rest solely on coercion, but no 
political system—even a democratic one—can survive without it 
either. With the largest per capita prison population in the 
world, it hardly befits the United States to complain about state 
coercion in the service of regime maintenance.9 Moreover, the 
belief that people respond to economic pressures premised on 
self-interest is central to the market economies that liberals 
favor. Still, the politics of self-interest, standing alone, is not only 
unlovely, but also quite inefficient. A regime dependent on this 
politics must bear the cost of continually providing the carrots 
and sticks necessary for its own preservation. 
A more hopeful and efficient possibility is the politics of 
moral responsibility. When this sort of politics works, people feel 
a justified obligation to follow the dictates of a constitution and 
of subrules authorized by that constitution, even if it is not in 
their immediate self interest to do so. What might give rise to 
such an obligation? Liberals claim that the obligation derives 
from the transsubstantive character of their constitutions. People 
feel, and should feel, an obligation to obey such a constitution 
because it is “made for people of fundamentally differing views.” 
But we have already seen that this claim is false. If constitutions 
are not and cannot be transsubstantive, then what is left is an 
obligation grounded in belief in the contestable substantive ends 
that a particular constitution seeks to advance. On this view, 
then, liberals will feel a justified obligation to obey only liberal 
constitutions, theocrats only theocratic constitutions, and so 
forth. 
To be sure, no constitution is ideal. Liberals, theocrats, and 
everyone else will have to make a judgment about whether a 
given nonideal constitution is nonetheless worthy of respect on 
the ground that its unraveling would produce worse results than 
its preservation. Perhaps the current constitution is the best deal 
on offer, and the benefits derived from it entail a reciprocal 
obligation to put up with its burdens. But, of course, it might also 
 
 9. PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN 2008, at 5 (2008), 
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_ 
FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf [hereinafter CENTER ON THE STATES]. 
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be possible that the constitution can be disaggregated with the 
good parts preserved and the bad parts jettisoned or 
undermined. Or perhaps imperfections can be corrected at no 
appreciable cost if we started over. No doubt, citizens will be 
forced to make difficult contextual political calculations. The 
important point, though, is that these calculations will be 
grounded in controversial substantive theories of justice, and 
people with different theories will come to different conclusions. 
In a diverse society like our own, this possibility of 
splintering and disunion is troubling.  The great goal of constitu-
tional governance is to provide unity among people who 
disagree about fundamentals. How is this goal to be achieved if 
constitutional obedience turns upon belief in the very doctrines 
that divide us? This problem leads to the third sort of politics 
that might produce obedience and, so, civic peace, in a society 
that disagreed about fundamentals. This is the politics of 
obfuscation. Perhaps people who, in justice, have no obligation 
to obey a particular constitution might nonetheless be tricked 
into believing that they have such an obligation. This sort of 
politics avoids the necessity of coercion by inducing voluntary 
compliance, while also avoiding the problem of fundamental 
disagreement by persuading people (falsely) that a biased 
constitution is really neutral.  The next section is devoted to this 
possibility. 
II. CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN A NONIDEAL SETTING 
(OR HOW TO STOP FANTASIZING AND MANAGE A 
SOFT LANDING INTO THE REAL WORLD) 
So far, I have patiently indulged this Symposium’s 
organizers by taking their hypothetical situation at more or less 
face value. At this point, though, it is useful to ask some 
subversive questions about the world that they ask us to imagine. 
In particular, just how did it come about that I—a lone law 
professor, and a politically and culturally marginal one at that—
was empowered to draft a new constitution for the United States 
of America? I must confess that, try as I might, I cannot get my 
mind around the circumstances that would produce this result. 
There are really only two possibilities: Either the 
counterfactual politics of this alternative universe is radically, 
unrecognizably different from our own, or the counterfactual me 
who lives in this universe is radically, unrecognizably different 
from the real me. So we are asking, in effect, how a Mike 
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Seidman, who is not Mike Seidman, would draft a constitution 
for a United States that is not the United States. With no actual 
experience living in a different skin in this different world, I 
cannot begin to imagine the contours of the constitution that 
would result. 
In order to make the thought experiment more coherent 
and interesting, we must imagine a situation closer to the world 
we actually live in. Three facts stand out about this world. First, 
in the real world, someone like me would have a marginal 
impact at best on the shape of a new constitution.  I and my 
allies (such as they are) can expect to be consistently outvoted, 
overpowered, or, most likely, simply ignored. We would be 
fighting a desperate, rear-guard action, trying to stave off truly 
terrible outcomes and making only very occasional and very 
marginal advances. The relevant question, then, is not what sort 
of constitution to draft with all the power, but how to avoid 
disaster with virtually no power. 
This is emphatically not a world where one has the luxury to 
work out ideal political theory or to take principled and 
uncompromising stands on issues of institutional design. It is an 
environment that privileges finely honed political instincts and 
craftiness rather than deep thought and theoretical insight.  
Better a Lee Atwater or Rahm Emanuel than a Roberto Unger 
or John Rawls. 
Second, like it or not, in our actual world, constitutional 
liberalism is the reigning ideology. No brilliant law review article 
or inspired work of political theory is about to change that. It 
will not do, then, to insist that liberalism is incoherent, 
contradictory, vapid, or evil. It is a fact on the ground that we 
must deal with rather than simply assume away. 
Third, in our current world, people who share my views are 
quite vulnerable and are likely to remain so for the foreseeable 
future. This is a world, therefore, that puts a premium on the 
acceptance of Nietzsche’s slave morality. No doubt, at first, this 
claim seems quite implausible—perhaps, even paranoid. After 
all, I occupy a privileged status in our society. I am economically 
more than comfortable with a not-very-demanding tenured 
position (and, as if this were not enough, protection into my 
dotage by the Age Discrimination Act!) that, for reasons that 
escape me, commands high social prestige. My own 
extraordinary good fortune, however, should not distract us from 
the fact that many others with outsider mentalities are in much 
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more danger of serious retaliation. We live in a society with a 
vast government security apparatus and a private, disciplinary 
culture that constantly brandishes, and occasionally uses, the 
power to crush its enemies. Moreover, we need to entertain the 
possibility that even the privileged, leftist elite may owe its 
relative security to the very liberal culture it deplores. 
This last point suggests a strategy for dealing with our 
imagined constitutional moment in something like our real 
world. From the defensive crouch that we necessarily occupy, 
people like me need to focus on the clear and present danger of 
catastrophic loss rather than the remote possibility of dramatic 
gain. It turns out that constitutional liberalism, already regnant, 
can be exploited to serve this purpose. Features of liberalism like 
civil liberties, procedural regularity, frequent elections, and 
pretensions to neutrality can provide at least some cover for 
unpopular outsiders. 
I do not mean to exaggerate the extent of this protection. 
We have learned from sad experience that, all too often, 
liberalism’s velvet glove hides an iron fist. It is asking a bit much 
of the  radicals rounded up during and immediately after World 
War I, of McCarthy’s victims in the 1950’s, or of today’s 
supporters of a free Palestine to expect them to sit through a 
lecture about liberalism’s virtues. Still, constitutional liberalism 
offers some protection. It has the capacity to convince some 
people, some of the time, that they have an obligation to tolerate 
views that they hate. It provides some space for political 
organization and pressure that would not otherwise be available. 
Moreover, even if we abandon our defensive crouch and 
proceed with more self-confidence, constitutional liberalism may 
still have an important role to play. Perhaps the right strategy for 
outsiders is to choose a few relatively unimportant provisions 
and devote all of their limited political power to including them. 
Even if they succeeded at the drafting stage, however, they still 
face the problem of insuring that people take these new 
provisions seriously. We have already seen that the politics of 
self-interest has its limits and that the politics of moral 
responsibility is not transsubstantive. How, then, can we assure 
obedience among people who disagree with substantive ends 
that we favor and that have, somehow been at least partially 
embedded in the constitution? 
Including within the Constitution some of the trappings of 
liberalism may provide a solution to this problem. The feature of 
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liberalism most useful in this regard is its uncanny ability (at 
least in our political culture) to persuade people of their duty to 
obey even when the politics of self interest and of moral 
responsibility fail. Viewed in one way, liberalism’s obfuscatory 
potential is precisely its problem. Supposedly expansive 
individual rights, supposedly free elections, a supposedly neutral 
playing field—all of these institutions serve to justify outcomes 
that should outrage us. On one view, then, outsiders should 
devote their energy to breaking down this ideology of 
legitimation. 
The other view, though, is that this approach is either 
hopeless or foolish. It is hopeless because constitutional 
liberalism is too deeply engrained in our political culture to be 
displaced. It is foolish because any constitution, even my 
nonliberal one, will require a mechanism that convinces the 
populace to obey, and, given our present political culture, 
liberalism’s pretentions to being transubstantive provide such a 
mechanism. 
It is important to understand just how limited and qualified 
this endorsement of constitutional liberalism is. First, I 
emphatically do not mean to endorse liberalism as a principled 
matter.  My view is far removed from John Rawls’ position that 
liberalism is necessary for political justice in a diverse society.10 I 
do not even endorse the view that he rejects—that liberalism 
might provide a mere modus vivendi for divergent groups.11 
Rather, my view is analogous to that entertained by some 
Catholics before Vatican II and before John Courtney Murray’s 
influential reinterpretation of Catholic doctrine for an American 
audience. Some pre-Vatican II Catholics treated religious 
toleration as a contingent good to be supported only when and 
to the extent that it advanced the interests of Catholics. 12 So, 
too, we might treat constitutional liberals as “useful idiots” who, 
at this particular moment in history, deserve our support 
because, but only to the extent that, they offer some protection 
to political outsiders and legitimation for good, nonliberal 
constitutional provisions. 
Second, my commitment to a seemingly liberal constitution 
is necessarily temporary, partial, and pragmatic. Because the 
 
 10. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
 11. Id. at 148. 
 12. For an excellent account of the older Catholic view and of Murray’s role in 
producing change, see generally Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian 
Liberals, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 297 (1997).  
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commitment is not to liberalism itself, but to the nonliberal 
causes that liberalism aids at this historical moment, it is subject 
to termination as soon as liberalism no longer aids those causes. 
Moreover, a constitution that was thoroughly liberal would, by 
definition, not advance nonliberal causes. What is required, then, 
is an outer liberal façade just thick enough to legitimate and 
protect the substantive, nonliberal provisions that lie within. 
No doubt, these views will strike many as unprincipled and 
perhaps even as deeply immoral.  Unsurprisingly, I think these 
charges miss the mark. The partial and pragmatic embrace of 
liberalism that I advocate is motivated by deep commitment to 
principle, albeit not to liberal principle. It is precisely the desire 
to further and protect these principles that motivates the search 
for a strategy that shields them from attack. To be sure, the 
strategy does not prioritize procedural principles. It does not 
treat “fair” and “neutral” processes as ends in themselves. 
Instead, institutions instantiating these processes are goods only 
so long as they advance the right substantive principles. But this 
is only to say that the strategy is not liberal (no surprise there), 
and it is surely unfair and non-neutral to claim that only liberals 
act out of principle. 
Another charge is more troubling. As I have already 
conceded, my embrace of liberalism is premised on liberalism’s 
obfuscatory and legitimating potential. As such, the strategy 
arguably fails to treat others as autonomous equals. It assumes 
that our fellow citizens are mere objects to be manipulated 
rather than human beings to be heard and respected. I am 
prepared to concede that nonliberal principles need not 
prioritize fair and neutral procedures. It is another thing 
altogether to cede to liberalism alone concern for individual 
autonomy and respect. On the contrary, my quarrel with 
constitutional liberalism is precisely that it accords too little 
attention to these concerns. So if my approach is indeed 
incompatible with autonomy and respect, then it is also 
incompatible with the constitutional ideals that I embrace. 
I must confess that I am troubled by this charge. If it is right, 
then we need a constitution that comes as close as possible to 
being authentically transsubstantive. I have argued elsewhere 
that such a constitution would be deeply unsettled. It would be 
written in open-ended terms that could be used by people of all 
views to advance their causes.13 This is the best version of liberal 
 
 13. See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW 
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constitutionalism—the best version of our Constitution—and it 
surely has its attractions. If one privileges civic peace and 
unfettered discourse, then perhaps it is the best that we can do.  
And, as I have just argued, even if one does not privilege these 
goods and, indeed, is not a liberal, such a Constitution may 
provide the best cover for the pursuit of nonliberal causes under 
our present conditions. 
Ultimately, though, for reasons discussed above, I do not 
think that even an unsettled constitution can be truly 
transsubstantive. Nor do I believe that a merely pragmatic 
embrace of liberalism is inconsistent with the respect that we 
owe to others. One must first note the deeply ironic nature of 
the latter charge. Recall that the complaint is about the inclusion 
of some liberal elements in our Constitution. How can liberals 
object to this?  True, my motivation for this inclusion stems from 
a belief that liberalism merely obfuscates and legitimates.  But if 
I am wrong about this—if a liberal Constitution really does 
respect dignity and autonomy as liberals insist—then there is 
surely no problem with the inclusion of these elements. If I am 
right, then my putative liberal critics need to reconsider their 
liberalism. 
Perhaps more to the point, there is indeed good reason for 
liberals to reconsider their liberalism.  The silent premise of their 
argument is that, but for the deeply cynical intervention of 
political radicals, Americans would regularly exercise 
meaningful political autonomy. If liberal constitutionalism were 
serving the goals that it sets for itself, this might be correct. In 
fact, though, anyone who pays any attention knows how false 
this claim is. Our society is marked by a huge and growing gap 
between rich and poor that has a deeply corrosive effect on our 
politics.14 We have an astonishing percentage of our population 
behind bars and an even larger percentage living in the shadows 
and excluded from political participation because they are not 
citizens.15 Our existing political culture is shot through with 
ignorance, lies, misinformation, manipulation, and subtle but 
nonetheless very effective forms of coercion. In a political 
 
THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001). 
 14. See Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political Representation, in THE 
UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATE 166, 167–68 (Lawrence R. Jacobs & Desmond S. 
King eds., 2009). 
 15. See CENTER ON THE STATES, supra note 9, at 5; PEW HISPANIC CENTER, 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 1 
(2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (finding that unauthorized 
immigrants constitute 3.7 percent of the U.S. population). 
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environment as degraded as this, the truly cynical move is to 
condemn people who recognize the truth of our situation and 
who try to use their knowledge of the truth to make things 
better. 
In the end, I hardly expect that this defense will convince 
liberals. There is a sense, though, in which this disagreement 
itself punctures liberal pretensions. The dispute demonstrates, 
yet again, that constitutional liberalism cannot bridge 
disagreements between people of good will as to what is to be 
done. Of course, this problem can be avoided if one pretends 
that people like me simply do not exist or that, if we exist at all, 
we are not people of good will. In other words, the liberal myth 
of a transsubstantive constitutional order can survive, but only if 
liberals deny to my side the respect and autonomy that they 
claim for themselves. And that denial is hardly liberal, is it? 
 
